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1. Goals of research on scientific discovery 
The purpose of this special issue of Artificial Intelligence is to report some recent 
research on computer systems that can discover scientific laws or concepts. 
For several decades, the processes of discovering new scientific laws and concepts 
have been a topic of AI research, directed at either or both of two goals: namely, 
understanding human scientific reasoning, and secondly developing systems which au- 
tonomously, or collaboratively with the expert, contribute to scientific knowledge. The 
two goals can be pursued independently, but in fact, they have been intermingled; ideas 
derived from research on human scientific discovery have been applied in systems that 
are not committed to humanoid methods; and the design of discovery systems have 
contributed ideas about the processes that might be used by humans when performing 
these tasks. There has been extensive mutually beneficial interaction between these two 
activities, 
A great variety of processes are used in scientific discovery. Research problems must 
be identified and representations that describe them and their potential solutions must 
be formulated. Data must be gathered by making observations and carrying out exper- 
iments. Instruments must be developed for carrying out observations and experiments. 
Regularities and patterns, that is to say, generalizations (laws) and concepts, must be 
sought to describe the data parsimoniously; once the initial laws have been formed, 
the observations are often then explained at a more detailed level where each of the 
substages are sometimes given a causal explanation. Laws and concepts must be gener- 
alized for use in creating more comprehensive theories. Inferences must be drawn from 
theories and empirical predictions made that can be tested by new observations and 
experiments. 
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A substantial period of the professional life of a single scientist or laboratory may 
be devoted to one or a few of these activities; alternatively, the scientist or laboratory 
may range over the complete range of activities. In any event, a single scientific report, 
recorded on the public blackboard known as “publication”, generally covers only a 
rather circumscribed aspect. Each published report provides potential inputs to one or 
more of the other activities, so that the blackboard becomes a principal instrument for 
cumulation and coordination of knowledge. A human scientist or a computer system 
programmed to engage in discovery activities may be viewed as a multi-stage process 
that uses information on the blackboard plus the empirical data it gathers as its inputs, 
and subsequently contributes new information to the same blackboard. 
Additionally, humans and computers may engage in the meta-scientific activity of 
building general theories of the scientific discovery process itself-either in the abstract, 
or as a basis for new discovery systems that can contribute to particular processes and 
specific sciences. 
The decentralized organization of science mentioned above, coordinated by the “black- 
board” of publication, is tolerant of simplicity in the individual components of the sys- 
tem. Of course, the price of this very loose form of coordination of relatively simple 
components is that the component systems must be capable of delivering their outputs 
in representations that are decodable by the other components. 
Research on data-mining methods has burgeoned in the past few years given the 
availability of large data bases, and their accessibility on the World Wade Web. However, 
this subfield is just beginning to address the questions of mutual accessibility and 
interpretation in a sophisticated way. Hence, such research may be expected subsequently 
to play an important role in the general advance in the application of computers to 
scientific discovery, and to be an important area of research in scientific discovery itself. 
2. Brief overview of recent and past work 
Work on the modelling of scientific discovery began very early in the history of 
artificial intelligence. Hunt and Hovland [ l] built a system that induced simple concepts 
from examples presented to it; Simon and Kotovsky [5] showed how patterns could 
be discovered in sequences, and the sequences could thereby be extrapolated-both 
programs exhibiting simple forms of law discovery. The DENDRAL program [ 41 of the 
late 1960s and 1970s used mass spectrogram data to discover the chemical formulae of 
complex molecules, while META-DENDRAL induced new constraints for incorporating 
into the DENDRAL search program. 
Lenat [3] built the AM system, which, given basic knowledge about a domain, was 
able to construct “interesting” new concepts in that domain, and this was followed 
by the EURISKO system that had capabilities for extending its repertory of discovery 
heuristics. Langley, Simon, Zytkow and Bradshaw [2] devised a series of programs 
which could derive scientific laws from data (BACON, GLAUBER, STAHL, DALTON, 
and others), which in turn suggested a theory of human scientific discovery. 
As noted earlier, efforts at modelling discovery processes have sometimes been aimed 
at developing a theory of human discovery, sometimes at constructing systems that can, 
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in collaboration with scientists or autonomously, engage in discovery work. Examples of 
autonomous or collaborative systems are MECHEM [7], which undertakes to elucidate 
the pathways of chemical reactions, and TETRAD [6], which produces causal explana- 
tions that are consistent with the correlation matrices of sets of variables. Discovery tools 
have also been developed in various areas of molecular biology, such as the GRAIL pro- 
gram [ IO] for detecting gene subsequences in anonymous DNA sequences, and various 
programs for inferring phylogenetic trees. Detailed reviews of recent scientific discovery 
research can be found in [ 111 and [ 81. 
The current special issue provides a sample of recent research. The impetus for this 
issue came from an AAAI Spring Symposium held at Stanford University in the Spring 
of 1995, although not all the work published here was presented there. Interestingly, 
four fifths of the articles of this special issue deal with biology or medicine, which 
departs somewhat from earlier published work that concentrated on chemistry, physics, 
and mathematics. 
3. The virtues of simplicity 
The discovery programs, both the programs already reported in the literature and those 
newly reported in this issue, are, for the most part, rather modest in size and simple in 
structure, as computer programs go. Because tasks as ambitious and as ill-structured as 
scientific discovery might be thought to call for very complex methods, we would like 
to offer a few comments on why large and complex programs have been the exception 
rather than the rule. 
A first reason for this simplicity has been mentioned earlier. Science is carried out 
in a very decentralized fashion, the “blackboard” of publication serving as a principal 
coordinating mechanism. Thus, generally any component of the system of science, 
human or machine, carries out only a relatively circumscribed range of activities. Its 
greatest complexities may reside in its capabilities for accepting and interpreting outputs 
from the blackboard, and for producing interpretable inputs to the blackboard. 
Thus, the BACON system requires as input, sets of values for the dependent and 
independent variables, and provides as output a law that describes the relation between 
the dependent and independent variables in the form of an algebraic equation. The 
input to the MECHEM program [7] is a set of starting substances and a partial set of 
the product substances observed in a chemical reaction described in standard chemical 
notation; it also can accept a large variety of constraints that reflect a user’s prior 
understanding [9]. MECHEM outputs hypotheses about the reaction pathway in the 
form of standard descriptions of a set of component reactions. 
Given the ability to use the available inputs and to produce intelligible outputs, not 
only do discovery programs tend to be simple, but they tend to produce rather simple 
results. This is partly a consequence of the way in which they generate solutions to 
the problems posed; the generators embedded in the programs generally start with the 
simplest hypotheses, then produce, if necessary, more and more complex ones that are 
created combinatorially, under the guidance of constraints and other selective heuristics, 
from the previous ones. 
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In any event, complexity of programs or of their outputs is not a measure of their 
“intelligence”. Given very complex tasks, complex algorithms may be a necessity, but 
they are clearly not a virtue. A central lesson of artificial intelligence, and of computing 
in general, is that if a task domain has strong structure and if sufficient domain informa- 
tion can be obtained, either a priori or in the course of computation, then rather simple 
programs may suffice. (The simplex method for solving linear programming problems is 
a classical example of simplicity achieved by efficient exploitation of a strong problem 
structure.) 
In science itself, a major goal is to describe nature by means of laws that are as 
parsimonious as possible. The same is true of a science of discovery, whose goal is 
not to awe with the complexity of the means employed, but to produce efficient and 
parsimonious procedures for achieving discoveries. Complex systems may sometimes be 
necessary; however, simplicity, when attainable, is always to be preferred. It is therefore 
gratifying that, during the initial decades of research on scientific discovery, it has been 
possible to construct a number of relatively simple programs, such as the examples 
mentioned above, which have powerful capabilities; similar simplicity is evident in the 
programs reported in this issue. 
4. Emerging issues 
At this point in time, there is sufficient understanding of scientific discovery that 
efforts should be directed toward developing significant discovery tools in a variety of 
sciences. These efforts should not proceed in a vacuum, but instead should build on the 
substantial number of discovery systems that exist, as well as on fruitful analogies that 
can be drawn among discovery tasks from disparate scientific fields. Discovery systems 
which solve tasks cooperatively with a domain expert are likely to have an important 
role, because in any nontrivial domain, it will be virtually impossible to provide the 
system with a complete theory which is anyway constantly evolving. Finally, as the 
domains tackled become more complex, we shall need to pay more attention to how 
the system and the domain expert communicate, and to how the user’s relevant prior 
knowledge can be identified and built upon. 
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